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Notes
ANIMALS-STOCK AT LARGE-DUTY OF OWNER-PARISH ORDI-
NANCEs-ARTICLE 2321 OF THE CIVIL CODE-Cattle of defendant
wandered onto plaintiff's truck farm and trampled a crop of grow-
ing cabbage. Plaintiff seeks damages, citing a parish ordinance
which prohibits owner from permitting cattle to run at large.
Held, while there is no general Louisiana statute prohibiting
owners from allowing their cattle to roam at large, it is well set-
tled that a local ordinance may accomplish the same effect and
render the owner of wandering cattle responsible for the damage
they cause to growing crops. Ingargiola v. Schnell, 11 So. (2d)
281 (La. App. 1942).
At common law the owner of domestic animals was under
an absolute duty to keep them restrained on his own premises
and was strictly liable for their trespass on another's land if he
failed to do so.1 The duty rested on the owner to fence the stock
in, and no duty rested on his neighbor to fence them out.2 In
Fox v. Koenig,3 a Wisconsin court declared that such liability was
absolute and depended in no degree upon the question of negli-
gence, yet they held the injury must have been foreseeable. Today
courts in the so-called grazing states hold that the owner of
crops cannot recover damages from the owners of trespassing
animals unless the crops are protected by a sufficient fence.' In
the more densely populated areas, statutes5 expressly reaffirm
the common law rule which places the duty on the owner of the
animal.
Louisiana has no general statUte prohibiting owners from
permitting their cattle to roam at large, but vests power in the
1. "Where my beasts of their own wrong without my will and knowledge
break another's close I shall be punished, for I am the trespasser with my
beasts." 12 Hen. VII, Keilway 3b. Accord: McKee v. Trisler, 311 Ill. 536, 143
N.E. 69, 33 A.L.R. 1298 (1924); Drew v. Gross, 112 Ohio St. 485, 147 N.E. 757
(1925); Fox v. Koenig, 190 Wis. 528, 209 N.W. 708, 49 A.L.R. 903 (1926).
2. Fox v. Koenig, 190 Wis. 528, 209 N.W. 708, 49 A.L.R. 903 (1926).
3. Ibid. But cf. Drew v. Gross, 112 Ohio St. 485, 147 N.E. 757 (1925), where
two-fold test of negligence and foreseeability was applied.
4. Morris v. Fraker, 5 Colo. 425 (1880); Delaney v. Erickson, 10 Neb. 492,
6 N.W. 600, 35 Am. Rep. 487 (1880); Pace v. Potter, 85 Tex. 473, 22 S.W. 300
(1893). Cf. Joiner v. Winston, 68 Ala. 129 (1881), where court held plaintiff
must have lawful fence.
5. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 8, § 1; Ohio Gen. Code Ann.
(Page, 1938) § 5809. [ 316 ]
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police juries of the different parishes to enact an ordinance to
that effect.' In this connection Article 2321 of the Civil Code7 is
significant. That article provides: "The owner of an animal is
answerable for the damage he has caused; but if the animal had
been lost, or had strayed more than a day, he may discharge
himself of this responsibility, by abandoning him to the person
who has sustained the injury; except where the master has
turned loose a dangerous or noxious animal, for then he must pay
for all the harm done, without being allowed to make abandon-
ment." It would seem that Article 2321 would impose a strict
liability upon the owner of stray animals, regardless of any
ordinance; but that article has been interpreted as being subject
to the fault requirements of Articles 2315 and 2316 of the Civil
Code.8 This liberal interpretation is clearly enunciated by Chief
Justice O'Niell in Tripani v. Meraux,9 where he declares: "Al-
though Article 2321 declares, unqualifiedly, that the owner of an
animal is answerable for the damage he has done, the interpreta-
tion which has been put upon this Article consistently by this
court is that the owner of an animal is liable for damages done
by the animal only in cases where the owner was guilty of some
fault or negligence in his ownership or possession of the animal."
The burden is on the owner to show that he was vithout the
slightest fault, 0 but the presumption of fault is a rebuttable one.'1
Next let us examine the effect of various parish ordinances
upon this question. There are so few cases on this question that
a separate consideration of each is justifiable. First let us con-
sider the cases where an ordinance prohibited the owner from
permitting his stock to run at large. In Williams v. Windham,'2
the owner was held liable for the damage done by his trespassing
animal. In Cristiana v. Sievers, 13 the court, in holding defendant
liable, declared that it was negligence not to keep a fence in the
6. La.. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 2743; La. Act 115 of 1898, § 1; La. Act 202 of
1902, § 1; La. Act 132(9) of 1906; La. Act 234 of 1928, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 6405].
7. Art. 2321, La. Civil Code of 1870.
8. Tillman v. Cook, 3 So.(2d) 230 (La. App. 1941).
9. 184 La. 66, 74, 165 So. 453, 455 (1936).
10. Damonte v. Patton, 118 La. 530, 43 So. 153, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 209, 118 Ani.
St. 384, 10 Ann. Cas. 862 (1907). Accord: Boudreau v. Louviere, 178 So. 173
(La. App. 1938).
11. Mercer v. Marston, 3 La. App. 97 (1925). Defendant did not have
knowledge of dangerous propensity of animal. Accord: Matthews v. Gremil-
lion, 174 So. 703 (La. App. 1937). Defendant did not know of horse's propen-
sities.
12. 3 La. App. 127 (1925).
13. 15 La. App. 579, 132 So. 375 (1931).
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proper state of repair or to carelessly permit cattle to roam.
This liability was extended in Kraak v. Gruntz14 to include the
situation where stock break through a fence and damage another's
property. It seems therefore that such an ordinance places a
duty upon the owner to use due care to restrain his stock. Where,
however, there is no such ordinance, it is up to the property owner
to fence the livestock off his premises, and plaintiff must show
that his property was inclosed with a sufficient fence before he
can recover for damage done by trespassing animals.1 5 Thus,
under the accepted interpretation of Article 2321,16 an owner is
not negligent or at fault in permitting his stock to run at large,
and he is not liable for the damage they cause.
An analogous problem is presented when animals are per-
mitted to wander upon the highway. This problem was recog-
nized in Drew v. Gross, 7 where the Ohio court declared that
when that state was established it was not unsafe to permit
domestic animals to run at large on the highway, but that with
the development of automobile traffic the situation had been
changed. Even applying this more modern approach to the prob-
lem, it is still the owner's duty to exercise care under the circum-
stances, and he is not liable where the animal breaks through an
apparently sufficient fence and goes onto the highway, unless
this propensity of the animal was foreseeable. 8 However, it has
been held that the mere presence of a boar on the highway made
out a prima facie case of negligence. 9
In Louisiana this problem again depends largely upon local
ordinances. In Boudreau v. Louviere, 0 defendant's mule was on
the highway and caused plaintiff to be injured. The court de-
clared that defendant was at fault because a local ordinance
prohibited owners from permitting their stock to run at large.
However, in Abrahams v. Castille," it was held that the owner
is not at fault when, due to an "Act of God" or other unforeseeable
14. 17 La. App. 179, 135 So. 122 (1931).
15. Parrott v. Babb, 15 La. App. 520 (1931).
16. Tripani v. Meraux, 184 La. 66, 165, So. 453 (1936).
17. 112 Ohio St. 485, 147 N.E. 757 (1925). Accord: Bartlett v. Galleppi
Bros., 33 F. Supp. 277 (D.C. Cal. 1940); Traill v. Ostermier, 140 Neb. 432, 300
N.W. 375 (1941).
18. Fox v. Koenig, 190 Wis. 582, 209 N.W. 708, 49 A.L.R. 903 (1926).
19. Hansen v. Kemmish, 201 Iowa 1008, 208 N.W. 277 (1926). Cf. Pelham
v. Spears, 222 Ala. 365, 132 So. 886 (1931), where court declared that even
though defendant negligently permitted his cow to be on the highway, the
negligence must have been connected with the damage and the owner must
have known of the animal's propensities.
20. 178 So. 173 (La. App. 1938).
21. 158 So. 650 (La. App. 1935).
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agency, his animal escapes from a fenced close and runs onto the
highway where it causes damage. Where there is no ordinance
prohibiting owners from permitting their stock to run at large,
the owner is not negligent in permitting them to be at large.
Thus it has been held that the owner of stock is not liable for
damages to a passing car;22 and that he may recover if his animal
is injured.2 3 Where animals are being lawfully driven along the
highway and one escapes and causes damage, the owner is not
liable, regardless of the fact that an ordinance exists.2 4
In earlier times many United States courts entirely rejected
the rule of strict liability for animal trespasses, as contrary to
local custom; but as the country has become more closely settled,
the tendency has been to restore the common law rule either by
statute or decision.2 5 The Louisiana legislature has shown con-
siderable foresight in making this question a matter of local
option, thus leaving each parish free to adopt a rule suitable to
local circumstances. As the state becomes more industrialized
and the need for a uniform law outweighs the economic burden
on the owners of animals, a general statute may be enacted which
will obligate the owner to keep his stock from running at large on
the highway, or from wandering onto the fields and gardens of
his neighbor.
C. C. L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FULL FAITH AND CREDIT - DIVORCE--
Petitioners were married to their respective spouses in North
Carolina, where they continued to live for a number of years.
Then they went together to Nevada, and, after remaining there
for a period of approximately six weeks, filed actions for divorce
against their respective North Carolina spouses. The defendants
in those divorce actions did not appear, nor were they served with
process in Nevada. Service was had on them through publication
and substituted service. The Nevada court found petitioners to be
bona fide and continuous residents of Nevada and the divorces
were granted. Immediately after obtaining the divorces petition-
ers were married in Nevada and returned to North Carolina. The
State of North Carolina indicted and convicted petitioners of the
22. Demarco v. Gober, 19 La. App. 236, 140 So. 64 (1932).
23. See Dunckelman v. Schockly, 183 So. 52, 53 (La. App. 1938). Recovery
not allowed as driver did all possible to prevent hitting the animal.
24. Cook v. Tooke, 17 La. App. 307, 135 So. 917 (1931).
25. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 434.
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